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THE LAWYER'S ROLE(S) IN
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY*
Carrie Menkel-Meadow**
"[Lawyers] serve as arbiters between the citizens."1
I. INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRATIC THEORY, PRACTICE AND LAWYERS
As legal theorists and academics we are drawn to grand meta-narratives
about governing institutions, democracies, political theories and the role of law,
citizens and elites in helping us to understand what are the best normative sys-
tems for us to use in governing ourselves. As a legal pragmatist and sometimes
legal clinician and practitioner, I have long been concerned with how our grand
theories operate in the empirical world. Can we make democratic theories
really work? What are the conditions that foster democratic participation or
good "democratic discourse" as current political theory describes it? What
might be the role of the lawyer in constructing and facilitating "optimal" or
"productive" democratic discourse? Are current institutions and current role
enactments up to the task of fostering democracy or should we consider new
forms of institutions and new legal and political roles? What challenges do new
institutions and new roles present to our older, deeply structured institutions
and roles - such as the Constitution, the political party system, the separation
of powers, federalism and the adversary system?
As a conflict resolution theorist and practitioner, I have noted that the
empirical world has changed greatly from the times in which most of our legal
and political institutions were conceptualized and created. Political and legal
issues are now often multi-partied and multi-issued,2 suggesting that older con-
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ceptions and institutions of dualisms and binary thinking (courts, political par-
ties, federal or state governing units, and public/private spheres of
responsibility) may be ill-suited to resolving, managing, or at least, handling,
modern day legal and social problems. These problems may require input from
a multiplicity of constituencies and coordinated action by a multiplicity of legal
and political institutions. As some of us explore the possibilities of new institu-
tions or more ad hoc processes, discussed below, which in turn suggest new
and different roles for actors in these processes, others are exploring the differ-
ent kinds of deliberations and activities that may occur in such different settings
(e.g., Jon Elster's exploration of the differences in principled argument versus
interest based bargaining in Constitution making).3 To what extent might we be
able to re-shape some of our institutional structures to permit different kinds of
democratic participation? To what extent are we "stuck" with the institutions
our founders have given us' which, in my view, continue to propagate unpro-
ductive oppositional, binary, polarized and adversarial approaches to more
complex problems?
Implicit in these meta-questions is an obvious normative statement about
the significance of the role of process in democratic deliberations and the qual-
ity of outcomes produced by such deliberations. Political philosophers and
legal theorists, notably John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas, Frank
Michaelman, Mark Tushnet, Cass Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman, among
others, are currently exploring the important question of whether we can actu-
ally articulate a procedural vision of democracy or justice or whether in the
end, it does boil down to our substantive and, likely, different preferences or
values. In this paper, I commit myself to the search for an articulation of a
process-oriented model of democratic deliberation and discourse, though I am
concerned that in the end it might turn out to be "it's just the values, stupid!",5
In particular, in this paper I explore the use of alternative legal, political
and social problem solving institutions that draw on conflict resolution theory
and practice. These institutions suggest that forms of "consensus building,"
3 See, e.g., Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
4 Consider, if you will, the recent suggestion (published before the election of 2000 debacle)
that Abigail Adams urged her husband to suggest to Thomas Jefferson, when the outcome of
the 1796 election was still uncertain, that a coalition government of Federalists and Republi-
cans should be formed. At least according to historian Joseph Ellis, John Adams made such a
proposal to Jefferson who considered it and then turned it down when advised by James
Madison that Jefferson's role was now to lead his party rather than to do business with "the
other side." As Adams' Vice President, Jefferson retired to Monticello to plan the next com-
petitive election. Imagine how different our governing structures might have turned out if
history had given us a different set of actions in that all important formative time. See
JOSEPH ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 179-83 (2000). Could we have had "coalition" govern-
ments with our non-Parliamentary structures?
I As a committed process-oriented mediator, I found the events surrounding the presidential
election of 2000 deeply troubling and potentially a defeat of the ideas proposed in this paper.
Process surely ran amuck - all of it - including elections, court proceedings, possible peace-
ful mediation efforts and coalitions, interest based bargaining and ultimately the legitimacy
of the whole system. This paper is a testament to my desire to push forward for alternative
conceptions of decision making, enactments of power and leadership and democratic
participation.
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which are both "principled" as well as based on "bargaining" models (when
bargaining does not necessarily entail compromise), may provide useful models
for democratic participation and political decision making sharply demarcated
from the processes we currently use. Whether such alternative processes or
institutions can be incorporated into or, in fact, challenge, traditional constitu-
tional and other regulatory government structures remains to be fully argued
and presented. Many legal scholars are currently engaged in that enterprise,
most notably, Charles Sabel, Michael Doff and other "constitutional experi-
mentalists," as well as those studying the negotiated rule-making processes in
administrative law (such as Cary Coglianese and Jody Freeman).
My contribution to this important theoretical and practical enterprise is to
examine the possible role of the lawyer in these newer forms of structured
democratic discourse. As a conflict resolution theorist, I have contributed to the
growing literature on exploring new processes for dispute resolution, transac-
tion creation, policy formation and political governance (following in the great
tradition of the "jurisprude of dispute resolution," Lon Fuller,6 and many
others, including Lawrence Susskind of MIT, one of the "fathers" of modern
consensus building theory and practice'). Here, I suggest that a slightly differ-
ent conception of the conventional lawyer's role might lend itself particularly
well to assisting in the practice of new forms of democratic discourse. New
processes and new institutions, whether they be ad hoc or made more perma-
nent, require new roles, both for "democratic experimentalism" to be facilitated
and also for effective evaluation. Who better than lawyers to attempt to facili-
tate (this is the crucial difference in role!) and test whether democratic dis-
course can occur in a highly contentious and substantively divided polity?
Must a lawyer "represent" a partisan interest to be a lawyer? So many of
the conventional definitions of "lawyer ' assume that an attorney is an advo-
6 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders
of ADR, 16 OHIo ST. J DisP. RESOL. 1 (2000); LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981).
7 See THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING
AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter "THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK."]. See especially Part I: An Alternative Robert's Rules of Order for Groups,
Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus.
8 "Lawyer":
A person learned in the law; as an attorney, counsel or solicitor; a person licensed to practice
law. Any person who prosecutes or defends causes in courts of record or other judicial tribunals
of the United States, or any of the States, or whose business it is to give legal advice or assis-
tance in relation to any cause or matter whatever.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 799 (5th ed. 1979).
"Attorney at law":
One of a class of persons who are by license constituted officers of courts of justice, and who are
empowered to appear and prosecute and defend, and on whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved in consequence. A quasi-judicial officer. Of course, the work of an
attorney is not confined to appearances in court for prosecutions and defenses. A person acting
professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings, by the warranty or authority of
his clients is an attorney at law within the usual meaning of the term. The distinction between
attorneys or solicitors and counsel or barristers is practically abolished in nearly all the states.
While some men [sic] of the profession devote their time and talents to the trial of cases and
others appear in court only rarely, the law imposes the same requirements for admission and the
same standard of ethics for both classes.
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cate of a party, a client, a cause, even in a non-litigation matter, that we can
hardly imagine that one acting as a lawyer could do so without a "position" or
"client" or cause that requires defense, advocacy or "offensive" representation.
In this paper I will explore the idea of a "neutral" lawyer who may have
neither "client" (in the conventional sense of client)9 to represent nor advocacy
to perform, yet still be functioning fully as a lawyer or "learned professional"
schooled in the law. Indeed, in this paper I will suggest that lawyers may be
especially useful in performing a variety of "new" functions that depart from
traditional conceptions of the lawyer's role, but which lawyers may be espe-
cially well suited to perform. It may be counter-cultural to think of lawyers as
"consensus builders," rather than as advocates or makers of conflict, but that is
just what effective lawyers must do. I will suggest that lawyers performing
such roles may need to reconceptualize their professional roles, the goals they
pursue, the activities they engage in and the rules and standards which might
govern their behavior. Paradoxically, I also want to suggest that "neutral" law-
yers (without clients or advocacy) may be well positioned to achieve or facili-
tate particular resolutions of legal problems that may contribute to "justice"
even more effectively than "non-neutral" advocates.
Many commentators on American lawyers, from Tocqueville to more
modem observers, have noted that lawyers may be particularly well suited to
the inter-class, interest, issue, policy and partisan mediation that our society
requires, not only to make laws, but to ensure smooth functioning of the ever
diverse polity and the myriad interests that need to be reconciled to achieve
social harmony and effective government. In the words of Anthony Kronman:
Lawyers serve private interests of clients but also care about integrity and justice of
the legal system that defines public order within which these interests are pursued. In
this way, they provide a link between the realms of public and private life, helping to
rejoin what the forces of privatization are constantly pulling apart.' 0
Lawyers,. then, can serve as mediators of the social order, helping to
achieve the bargained for (traded), principled (reasoned) and creative (problem
solved) arrangements that permit peaceful co-existence, social harmony and at
its best, social justice to occur. This article suggests that if democratic partici-
pation is the means for achieving both public order and social justice, lawyers
have a role to play in such processes, but the roles may be different from con-
ventional roles of legal representation. Lawyers may represent parties or groups
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (3d ed. 1969).
9 Clearly, lawyers serving as facilitators, consensus builders or mediators have "clients"
(people who pay them for their work), but here the client is not the same as the "represented
client." See the distinctions drawn in definitions of client in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, particularly, Rule 2.2 (which until 2000 provided for a role for lawyers to act as
"Intermediaries" between clients). In 2000, the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission removed
Rule 2.2 (which was seen as confusing roles of representation of parties and mediation with-
out representation and adopted, instead, Rule 2.4 (Serving as a Third Party Neutral) to
explicitly recognize the lawyer who serves as a neutral. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.12 (2003) and MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT 2.4 (2003), with MODEL
RULE FOR LAWYERS AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL, pmbl. (Georgetown-CPR Commission on
Ethics and Standards in ADR, (updated Jan. 2004)), at Public Policy Projects, http://
www.cpradr.org. (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
10 Anthony T. Kronman, The Law as a Profession, in ETHics IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS'
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 36 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
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in democratic participatory events (like lobbying, negotiated rule-making and
advocacy) but they may also be particularly well suited to facilitating such
processes (and new ones), with perhaps some different orienting frameworks
and some additional forms of training and education.
II. POLITICAL THEORY
Both democratic and constitutional theorists have recently drawn attention
to a variety of "crises" in our theories and practices of governance, suggesting
that complexity, volatility and diversity have led to such fragmentation of the
polity that grand theories (constitutionalism,11 universal generalized agree-
ments) and grand practices (separation of power, federalism, the administrative
state) may be impossible to justify, not to mention effectively implement. One
claimed solution to this modern dilemma has been to turn to what is called
"democratic discourse" theory - a process "solution" to a variety of substantive
governance problems. While some focus on democratic discourse in its theoret-
ical formulations, and others focus on the best institutional forms for con-
ducting democratic deliberation, I want to focus on the particular role of
lawyers in the design and implementation of sites and processes for such dis-
course to occur.
For some, modern democratic theory is premised on the notion that com-
munication, dialogue and deliberation by constituencies, citizens, voters and
decision makers will produce better and more legitimate outcomes. 12 New
reformulations of democratic theory have recently suggested that process val-
ues are key to democratic legitimacy.13 Indeed, some go so far as to suggest
" See e.g., Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
12 For a critique of "talking" as a democratic problem-solving process see Frederick
Schauer, Talking as Decision Procedure, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOC-
RACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999). For a concrete suggestion for how to
improve the voting part of deliberative democracy, see JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND
DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991) (suggesting public opin-
ion polling after provision of relevant information and opportunity for discussion). For some
empirical verification of how these processes are effective, see, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, EMPOW-
ERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY (2004); CARMEN SIRIANNI &
LEWIS FRIEDLAND, CIVIC INNOVATION IN AMERICA: COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE MOVEMENT FOR CIVIL RENEWAL (2001); ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN
WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACRY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PAR-
TICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (2003); THOMAS BEIRLE AND JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN
PRACTICE: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (2002).
13 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES K. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004); DELIBER-
ATION AND DECISION: ECONOMICS, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY (Anne Van Aaken et al. eds., 2004); JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION:
PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS,. CONTESTATIONS (2001); DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster & Adam Przeworski eds., 1998); JAMES K. FISHKIN & PETER LAS-
LET, DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (2003); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.,
1996); MARK KINGWELL, A CIVIL TONGUE: JUSTICE, DIALOGUE, AND THE POLITICS OF PLU-
RALISM (1995); DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Ste-
phen Macedo ed., 1999); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BET-ER TOGETHER: RESTORING THE
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that it is only the process values about which we can have a priori agreement.14
If process is to be the foundational justification of democratic institutions, then
lawyers have a great role to play in the practice of democracy as both "process
architects" 15 and as process managers. To the extent that modem life is charac-
terized by greater social fragmentation, diversity, demographic and cultural
pluralism, multi-party and intractable disputes 6 which have created greater
social complexity than many of our current political and legal institutions can
effectively deal with, new forms of political and legal participation may be
necessary. Where modem social and legal problems no longer lend themselves
to easy two-sided contested positions for resolution either by votes in partisan
legislatures or binary judgments in courts of law,' 7 new forms of public (and
private) decision making may be necessary not only to resolve social and politi-
cal conflicts, but to find policy solutions to problems of resource allocation,
institution building and social and human welfare. Thus, modem theories of
deliberative democracy recognize that we may need new social, political and
legal forms to deal with our modem problems of social complexity.
To the extent that participation remains a cornerstone of democratic the-
ory, new forms of participation (whether direct or mediated by agents or repre-
sentatives) may require the creation of new institutions or modifications of old
forms to permit optimum levels of participation for effective and legitimate
outcomes. Whether tied to traditional constitutional and legal institutions, like
courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies, or created new out of the par-
ticularities of specific situations (as in negotiated consensus building fora), 8
lawyers have the knowledge, skills, craft and wisdom (if effectively employed)
to help create and manage such institutions.
Foundational values remain contested among modern democratic dis-
course theorists, along fault lines in which process is itself the end or merely
the means for at least provisional substantive outcomes. Theorists disagree
about appropriate models of conflict and cooperation, social choice, authority,
legitimacy, neutrality 9 or objectivity, and distributive versus substantive social
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2003); ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004); IRIS YOUNG, INCLUSION AND
DEMOCRACY (2002).
14 See STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000) (arguing that an agreement that
there be fair procedures for adversarial debate on any important social issue is all that we can
obtain consensus for - agreement on substantive outcomes for a just society is unlikely in
any diverse society).
15 "Process Architect" is a term originally coined by both Lon Fuller and the Legal Process
school legal theorists. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6. The term "process architect" has
become more commonly used in recent writing about lawyers in negotiation and other forms
of ADR. See e.g., ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000).
16 See generally DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE
RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEF-
FREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUB-
tic DIsPrUEs (1987).
17 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2.
18 THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7.
19 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (Yale Univ. Press 1980).
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justice.20 The value of consent or true participation, by the governed - that
"legitimate laws are authored by the citizens who are subject to them"'', -
seems central to any discussion of modem political decision making. Indeed, as
many social and political theorists have abandoned any hope of agreeing in
advance on the common good, procedural ideals of issue-by-issue deliberation
and negotiation have supplanted substantive conceptions of the common good
in much political philosophy.
Turning away from substantive discussions of the just and the good does
not eliminate theoretical or practical debate - the terrain has shifted to what
kinds of processes or procedures may best facilitate either partial or more
global "agreements" about the good and the just. What is fair becomes the
principal concern in these process-oriented theories. Thus, some political theo-
rists look to "reasoned deliberation" focused on rationality, principled and
rational discourse.22 Other theorists focus on explicit models of bargaining and
interest or preference trading or negotiation. 3 Still others concentrate on the
recognition of emotional or subjective sensibilities (such as empathy and
"imaginative identification") 4 in the processes by which modem political
actors must get things done.25 Some insist that foundational principles like
American constitutionalism are essential to the legitimacy and fairness of any
dispute resolution and political governance system,26 while others suggest that
constitutionalism is too rigid and prevents important procedural flexibility in
which process rules are negotiated along with substantive outcomes, as particu-
lar parties and problems require.27 Modem political theorists seek to describe,
elaborate and in some cases, prescribe, "ideal speech conditions,"28 "ideal
proceduralism, ' '29 "procedural justice," "fairness in procedure as an invariable
value"30 or "discourse ethics" at various levels of theoretical complexity.
Others have focused on "new institutions' 31 or new understandings or recon-
figurations of existing governmental institutions, like courts,3 2 legislatures, 33
20 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, in LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE
(M.D.A. Freeman ed., 7th ed. 2001); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(Harvard Univ. Press 1977); ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRE-
TATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW (Ashgate Pub. Co. 2003).
21 BOHMAN, supra note 13 at 5.
22 Elster, supra note 3; HABERMAS; supra note 13.
23 Elster, supra note 3.
24 HAMPSHIRE, supra note 14 at 80.
25 JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1999); JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS ON
RATIONALITY (Cambridge Univ. 1997).
26 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE, FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE
THE PEOPLE, TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
27 BOHMAN, supra note 13, at 17.
28 HABERMAS, supra note 13.
29 BOHMAN, supra note 13, at 17.
30 HAMPSHIRE, supra note 14, at 4.
31 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11.
32 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimen-
talist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Judith Kaye, Changing Courts in Chang-
ing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L. REv. 851
(1997).
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and agencies,34 often by focusing on new public and private collaborations.
Still others suggest that new forms of participation will themselves generate
new substantive solutions or at least contingent accommodations, recognizing
that the tools used to solve problems may influence the resolutions that may be
recognized.35
For Jurgen Habermas, law is made necessary by modem demands of coor-
dination of the market sphere, administrative power and cultural and demo-
graphic pluralism.36 The rule of law permits what is not prohibited, but the rule
of law (and moral norms) are legitimate if and only if all possibly affected
persons could agree to them as participants in rational discourse (the "dis-
course principle"). 37 To fully participate in the discursive community, accord-
ing to Habermas, there is co-origination of private liberties and public
autonomy - that is, discourse can occur only if there is recognition of the
essential "right" of equality of participation. We can understand equal "rights"
only after we have "discussed" them and acknowledged them. Discourse itself
depends on the "equal" participatory rights of each individual to have "equal
standing" to propose agenda items, suggest solutions to issues on the agenda, to
offer reasons (or other "arguments") 38 for acceptance or rejection of solutions,
to offer criticism and to have an "equal voice" in the decision.39 In some ver-
sions of discourse theory, there is an additional substantive requirement that
inequality of power and resources should not "control" decision-making and
disproportionately distort or "coerce" deliberation.4 ° How this theory can be
33 Such as in "quasi-legislating dispute resolution" or "LDR," as one commentator has
called it in describing the regionalized negotiations for habitat regulations, see BRUCE BAB-
Bnr, ADR CONCEPTS: RESHAPING THE WAY NATURAL RESOURCES DECISIONS ARE MADE,
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM-SOLVING AND ADR
(CPR Institute for Disp. Reso., 2001) (suggesting that both courts and modem legislatures
cannot effectively manage multi-stakeholder natural resource allocation problems).
34 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1 (1997) [hereinafter "Freeman, Collaborative Governance"]; Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) [hereinafter "Freeman, Private
Role"]; Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations; A Cure for the Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1
(1982); Laura I. Langbein & Jody Freeman, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 N. ENVTL L .J. 60 (2000).
35 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third Party Neu-
tral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 787 (1999)
(describing the "tools to theory heuristic" which tells us that the tools or processes we use
affect the outcomes we produce) (quoting Gerd Gigerenzer, Where Do New Ideas Come
From? in DIMENSIONS OF CREATIVITY 53 (Margaret A. Boden ed., 1994)).
36 HABERMAS, supra note 13.
7 HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 107; Joshua Cohen, Reflections on Habermas on Democ-
racy, in 12 RATIO JURIS. 385, 392 (1999).
38 While Habermas' conception of discourse theory is premised on "reasons," others have
suggested that discourse can permit appeals and arguments from sources other than "rea-
sons," such as emotions, beliefs, interests, needs, etc., depending on the context. See, e.g.,
ELSTER, ALCHEMIES, supra note 25; Cohen, supra note 37; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754 (1984).
3' Cohen, supra note 37, at 397.
" Both Habermas and Rawls insist on such "substantive" conditions of equal participation,
at least in theory. It is hard to imagine an "actual" example of discourse or deliberative
democracy in which inequality of power does not influence the decision (since the definition
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translated into practice in modem, complex and pluralistic social and legal
problems is the subject of this paper.
Legal scholars and practitioners (as well as other professionals) enact
these theories "on the ground" by theorizing, inventing, implementing and eval-
uating various forms of democratic discourse as they attempt to solve real
problems in practice. For Habermas, as for other discourse theorists, problem
solving occurs in several spheres, some formally constituted (through Constitu-
tional structures and institutions, like legislatures, courts and administrative
agencies) and others through more informal "circulation" of problems, ideas
and solutions. In this "two track" process, public discourse in associational and
deliberative settings creates, identifies and debates problems while more formal
institutions approve solutions to and resolve those problems. Even the kinds of
thinking or decision making which occur in different spheres may be different
- some offer models of rational decision making in rather formalistic
processes," while others offer more "naturalistic" or fluid processes of deliber-
ation and decision choices.42
Recently, a variety of political theorists and social scientists have pro-
posed and studied specific examples of deliberative processes used in different
forms of social and legal problem solving, often in highly politicized situations.
Seeking to explore not only formal institutions like courts, legislatures and
agencies, these students of the political process suggest that other forms may
effectuate the conditions of legitimate political action where they permit the
articulation of new problems and issues, experimentation and implementation
of new proposals and solutions that involve participation by those affected by
the decisions made. Called variously, "intermediate sites"'43 of democracy, "the
informal or dispersed public sphere," "directly-deliberative polyarchy" (to
institutionalize direct problem solving by citizens)' or "consensus building" or
of power involves the ability to control or influence other's behaviors. See ROBERT ALAN
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (Yale Univ. Press
1961); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (Yale Univ. Press 1998); ROBERT A. DAHL, How
DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (Yale Univ. Press 2001). For an example of
the more common claim that inequality of power or resources inevitably does affect the
decisions that are made, see Iris Marion Young, Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democ-
racy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 13, at 151, who argues that women on welfare
were not equal participants in recent welfare reform debates.
41 JOHN S. HAMMOND et al., SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETrER
DECISIONS (Harvard Bus. School Press 1999); Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, Lawyers as Prob-
lem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 811 (1999).
42 GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS (MIT Press 1998).
Some distinguish deliberation (use of reasons) from bargaining (trading of preferences).
Others see bargaining as a form of reasoning. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private
Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637
(1976).
4 Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Learning from Conflict: Reflections on Teaching About
Race and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL. ED. 515 (2003); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of
Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1996).
" Joshua Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313
(1997); see also William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127 (2004) (contrasting legal
pragmatism and problem solving to legal liberalism and rights based litigation).
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"town meeting" activities, there are both new institutional forms and new
processes4 5 to examine.
Those that describe such processes do not always agree about their pur-
poses, structures or operation. Thus, for some, "consensus," or some form of
agreement by participants, beyond a majority, is an essential part of the com-
mitment.46 For others, consensus may never be possible or desirable (espe-
cially about pre-deliberation commitments). New democratic institutions are
"pragmatic" because they may develop issue-specific resolutions or develop
collaboration out of necessity, rather than "real" and deep agreement. For still
others, democratic discourse doesn't even produce policy or decisional "out-
comes," just the possibility of increased conversation and understanding.47
For Doff and Sabel,48 for example, more localized sites of experimenta-
tion in policy initiation, analogized to corporate and organizational develop-
ments, interact with national systems of information sharing and
accountability49 to produce greater citizen participation and collective problem
solving, while retaining commitments to basic Constitutional allocations of
power.
For others, such as James Bohman and Lawrence Susskind (scholars
outside of legal studies) commitments to existing or foundational Constitutional
structures are not as important as on-going negotiation and consensus about the
very process that is used in deliberating about either specific issue resolution or
more sustained social problem solving. In modem parlance this is often called
"adhocracy" - the importance of tailoring processes to particular decision mak-
ing in particular cases, without requiring or relying unnecessarily on more for-
mal, regularized and institutionalized processes.
For still another group of theorists the crucial issue is what constitutes
"proper" deliberation, both in terms of permissible discourse ("reason" vs.
"non-rational" emotional, religious, and passionate appeals to needs and inter-
ests) and the processes by which differences are resolved and choices are made
(reasoned argument, persuasion and acceptance or bargaining, trade and
compromise).
Is democratic deliberation an end in itself (as the process theorists argue)
or is it recommended because it produces better (or more legitimate) outcomes
(as the utilitarians would defend it)? Can democratic discourse "resolve" moral
45 Whether such processes must be institutionalized or are better left flexible and not for-
malized is itself one of the interesting "practice" questions of the theory of discursive
democracy. See THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (Resources for the Future 2002); Christine
Carlson & John Stephens, Governance and Institutionalization: How May the Institutions of
Government Make Appropriate, Sustained Use of Consensus Building Processes at the Local
Level? The State Level? The Federal Level? The Tribal Level, at http://www.acresolution.
org/research.nsf/keyepp02-2.
46 THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7.
47 See, e.g., Public Conversations Dialogues on Abortion, at http://www.publicconversa-
tions.org.
48 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11.
49 Id.
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conflicts or only "political" ones?5° Legal theorists tend to emphasize the
importance of individual rights, equality and institutional settlement principles
(like courts as ultimate decision makers, even if "transformed" into problem
solving courts) while political theorists and practitioner philosophers are more
likely to want to recognize new forms with greater direct citizen participation."
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, however, also suggest that the
proceduralists and process theorists neglect to notice how different processes
and rules enact particular substantive outcomes with important moral, and eco-
nomic consequences.
If there is only one thing such varied theorists seem to have in common, it
is a belief that greater, wider and deeper participation in democracy and politi-
cal and legal decision making will be better for our society, as well as for
individuals (contra Oscar Wilde's view that the trouble with socialism (read
democracy) is that it takes too many evenings/meetings). 2 The unifying theme
is one of articulating a vision of collaborative, cooperative social processes, in
opposition to the more adversarial and competitive assumptions of Hobbesian
and Madisonian theories of contest and factionalism in human deliberation.
And, in other respects, the claims for deliberative democracy recapitulate old
dualisms between liberalism (individualism) and democracy (republican and
representative forms).
Unfortunately, while these various descriptions of deliberative democracy
are appealing, they continue to refer to traditional, argumentative and dualistic
conceptions of discourse. James Bohman, for example, elaborates a variation
on Habermasian discourse theory by distinguishing "dialogue" from "dis-
course." "Dialogue" refers to a responsive process in which it is expected that
reasons or arguments will invite a "response" and will remain open to constant
revision as new arguments are made. The purpose of deliberation is "joint prob-
lem solving" or a discourse with "special characteristics" '53 in which there are
"back and forth exchanges" in historical, cultural and interpersonal terms.
54
Bohman specifies five characteristics of dialogue-as-problem-solving: 1) mak-
ing explicit in argument what is often latent; 2) exchanges on differences of
temporal and cultural experiences (life and group histories); 3) applications of
given norms or rules to specific cases; 4) "articulation" of the relation of vague
and abstract ideals to the specifics of various proposals (a sort of "thick
50 This is Gutmann & Thompson's major concern, and they define a series of "middle
democracy" issues that fall into this category - health care, welfare policy, environmental
policy, affirmative action and diversity issues. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 13.
51 JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER" ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATORY PLAN-
NING PROCESSES (1999) (describing participatory collaborations between professional plan-
ners and citizens).
5 OSCAR WILDE, A LIFE IN QUOTES 238 (Barry Day comp. & ed., 2000). For conflicting
evidence on whether we are in fact participating in our polis more or less, compare ROBERT
D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2000), with Civic ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Theda Skocpol & Morris P.
Fiorina eds., 1999).
53 BOHMAN, supra note 13, at 57.
54 Id. at 57-69.
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description" 55 of proposal justification) and 5) a capacity for "perspective and
role taking" which permits imaginative understanding (empathy) of the "other."
These are all laudable aspirations for procedural fairness, but they are
incomplete. Like Stuart Hampshire's specification of the ideal procedural value
of "fair hearing of contrary claims" and contest, notions of argument and
response are only partial - necessary, perhaps, but not sufficient: "Only the one
most general feature of the processes of decision is preserved as the necessary
condition that qualifies a process, whatever it happens to be, to be accounted as
an essentially just and fair one; that contrary claims are heard."56
These descriptions, as most descriptions of deliberative processes, con-
tinue to refer to what Hampshire calls "the universal principle of adversary
argument."'57 To the extent that modern discourse theorists continue to posit
adversarial, two-sided models of discourse, they are presenting incomplete and
inaccurate descriptions of modem social and legal problem solving. Disagree-
ments may exist along a spectrum of views and most modem issues present
themselves with multiple challenges and forms of resolution, especially when
multiple parties are involved. It is the very "multi-plexness ' 58 of most modem
governance problems that require discourse, but not a simple dialectical
process.
Modern discourse theorists seem somewhat blinded by a permanent form
of Janus-faced mask. There are "two sides" of an issue or contest: adversarial
procedure and argumentation (in Hampshire's terms), moral or political "oppo-
nents" (in Gutmann and Thompson's terms59). Two layers of institutional com-
munication also exist: formal-informal, ordinary and extraordinary
"Constitutional" moments (Ackerman 60 ), dispersed private discourse and pub-
lic institutional resolution (Habermas), "local" forms of experimentalism with
national bodies of information sharing and accountability monitoring (Sabel &
Dorf) or more conventional forms of federal-state divisions of labor and regu-
latory authority. This seemingly primitive need for dualisms in deliberative
structures at both institutional and substantive levels obfuscates modem reality
which often has multiple layers of issues, parties and institutions.
One would think that a Constitutional regime which recognizes, three, if
not four, branches of government, 6 I and a procedural system which permits
class actions and party intervention and interpleaders could recognize that
deliberation need not be merely dualistic and indeed becomes both more par-
ticipatory, and legitimate, if more difficult, when it acknowledges a greater
variety of issues, parties and institutional forms for deliberative processes. Not
all processes are dyadic; not all issues have only "two-sides," arguments can
have many parts and any group of people can agree on some issues (wholly or
partially) and disagree about others.
55 Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES; SELECTED ESSAYS (1973).
56 HAMPSHIRE, supra note 14, at 16-17.
57 Id. at 29.
58 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971).
59 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 3.
60 ACKERMAN, supra note 26.
61 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
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Thus, democratic discourse theory needs to learn from dispute resolution
theory, that positions and parties may be multiple, that processes of deliberation
may range from principled argument to interest-based bargaining and coali-
tional behavior, to appeals based on emotions, faith and belief, as well as fact.
These different levels of "discourse" must be "coordinated" and understood if
deliberative democracy is not to be manipulated or used strategically, rather
than authentically.
Here, I seek to describe some of these social, political and legal experi-
ments in new processes and to elaborate the lawyer's role as a facilitator of
deliberative democracy. Whether the lawyer must be cabined to one sphere or
another (or whether there are in fact only two spheres - the formal and the
informal) is one of the central concerns of this essay. For as process experts,
lawyers may be particularly well suited for "translating" between spheres.62 As
the moral philosopher Stuart Hampshire recently suggested, "the skillful man-
agement of conflicts is among the highest of human skills."' 63 Consensus build-
ing lawyering is one of the concrete ways in which the vision of deliberative
democracy can be realized.
III. CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESSES
The terms "consensus building process," "public dispute resolution," "pol-
icy dialogues," "public conversations," "negotiated rule-making" and "facili-
tated problem solving conflict resolution"64 all describe efforts to create new
forms of participatory and democratic lawmaking, decision making and prob-
lem solving. What these processes have in common is an effort to bring all
interested parties, called "stakeholders," together to negotiate their own process
rules (which may vary from majority votes to unanimous consensus or veto
power) for making decisions, either final or contingent, with structured meet-
ings, almost always led or facilitated by an expert "third party neutral" with
process expertise and often with substantive expertise as well.
From the perspective .of democratic theory these processes are intended to
be closer to direct democracy models (town meetings) than representative mod-
els (although there will often be "representation" of groups and constituencies,
especially "surrogates" to represent parties who are "interested" but may not be
organized). These processes often use small group and multiple track negotia-
tion and decision-making processes to focus on particular issues, tasks,
resource allocations, definitional issues or to develop principles and bases for
decisions.
The underlying conception is Habermasian - to create "ideal speech con-
ditions" in which citizens or interested parties communicate directly with each
other and with decision makers to participate in the making of rules or deci-
62 This is, of course, a variant on de Tocqueville's argument that lawyers in the United
States served the intermediary function between the governed and the governors, performed
in other societies by the aristocracy. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
63 HAMPSHIRE, supra note 14, at 35.
64 JOHN BURTON & FRANK DUKES, CONFLICT: PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT, SETrLEMENT,
AND RESOLUTION (1990).
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sions that will affect them. In this conception, each individual or "interest" has
an equal right of participation, argumentation and decision power.
The ethos is intended to be one of "collaborative," rather than "competi-
tive" approaches to problem solving, especially where there are multiple parties
and multiple interests not lending themselves to simple zero-sum distributional
solutions. Inevitably, of course, coalitions may develop among and between
different interest groups. Skilled facilitators and process managers are neces-
sary to monitor "strategic" processes and insure "authentic" participation. Par-
ticipants generally develop their own ground rules, which include processes for
information sharing, joint fact-finding, development of expert knowledge, and
rules of decision. Most consensus building professionals regard themselves as
enforcers of a participatory democracy model that differs from simple majority
rule, so that "minority" interests are fully heard and protected. Whether the
"consensus" is purely unanimous or some other rule of decision arrived at by a
group, "consensus" is meant to convey more "consent" than simple voting.
These democratic dispute resolution processes also aim to solve underly-
ing problems, address all participants' needs and interests, as best as possible,
so that the focus of decision making is both more complete, deeper and fuller
than occurs in other institutional problem solving settings, like courts or legisla-
tures. Thus, consensus building processes are often multi-disciplinary, taking
account of legal requirements and standards, but focusing on issues beyond
what might be denominated as "merely legal."65 Such processes are designed to
develop more creative and better substantive solutions to problems, where
information is shared across disciplines and approaches from outside of the
conventional frame are considered. In addition to being more "creative," solu-
tions to problems from such processes may also be more "implementable,"
because they have been vetted by a larger number of people and interest groups
that might be affected by particular solutions.
Outcomes of such processes may vary as well, ranging from final and firm
decisions, to resource allocations (i.e., block grant allocations or environmental
liability), to contingent agreements,66 to simple dialogue without "result,"6 7
other than enhanced understanding on highly divisive issues and values con-
flicts. Such processes may also be used before "problems" develop, such as in
construction "partnering ' 68 processes, strategic planning processes, reg-neg
and environmental siting.
65 See, e.g., Morning Edition: School Funds Lawsuit (NPR broadcast, Aug. 24, 2000)
(Attorney General Eagly in North Carolina refers to educational practices in North Carolina
which he is defending as "constitutional" but not good educational policy).
66 See, e.g., Edward Scher, Negotiating Superfund Cleanup at the Massachusetts Military
Reservation, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 259.
67 See Catherine Flavin-McDonald & Martha McCoy, Study Circles: Moving from Acri-
mony to Democracy Building, 4 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 14 (1998); Margaret Herzig, Public
Conversations: Shifting to Dialogue When Debate is Fruitless, 4 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 10
(1998); Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstaphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in
THE CONSENSus BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1031.
68 Lindsey "Peter" White, Partnering: Agreeing to Work Together on Problems, 4 DisP.
RESOL. MAG. 18 (1998).
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These new processes have begun to influence traditional legal institutions.
There are now multi-dimensional "problem solving" courts in family law,
69
drug and vice,7° and business settings.7" Administrative agencies have adapted
mediational and consensus building processes to the rule-making process as
"negotiated rule-making" or "reg-neg."7 Even lawyers representing clients in
adversary settings are now looking at "collaborative lawyering"73 as an alterna-
tive model to advocacy in which lawyers commit in advance to try to solve
problems through negotiation and other means and pledge to avoid polarizing
litigation.
IV. APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES OF CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESSES
Modem attempts to operationalize democratic participation in contested
legal and social issues are several decades old, but are only now beginning to
gamer legal scholarly attention. Used in such matters as municipal finance and
block grant allocations, environmental siting, environmental clean-up, commu-
nity and neighborhood disputes and administrative negotiated rule-making,
most consensus building processes formally recognize the existence of multiple
stakeholders and interested parties in dispute resolution, resource allocation and
policy formation." What differentiates consensus building processes from
other processes are the following features:
1. Agreement by parties as to operative "ground rules" (which include
rules for participation, information gathering and decision rules) which are
particular for the event and not "universal" (such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order);75
2. Agreement by parties as to decision rules (definitions of "consensus" or
super-majorities, vetoes) for agreements or recommendations (as when all
a group can do is make "recommendations" to a properly constituted legal
body, such as a zoning board, administrative agency or legislative body);
3. Use of an expert "facilitator" or group of facilitators to monitor
processes and in some cases, to coach parties with respect to negotiation
skills, coordinate information sharing, manage meetings, develop agendas,
record proceedings, prepare texts for negotiation, assess conflicts as well
69 Kaye, supra note 32.
70 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 32.
71 See, e.g., Celia Cohen, Delaware Chancery Court Is Now Using Mediation, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 30, 2000, at B7. The London Commercial Court is a specialized court that hears only
commercial cases on the theory judges will have or develop expertise and craft "business-
like" decisions.
72 See generally Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 34; Freeman, Private
Role, supra note 34; Harter, supra note 34; cf Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); William
Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion
of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997).
73 Robert W. Rack, Jr. Collaborative Lawyering: For Lawyers, It's Settle or Withdraw, 4
Disp. RESOL. MAG. 8 (1998).
74 For the most comprehensive description, with examples, of consensus building events,
see THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7.
" Susskind has attempted to draft an alternative set of "Rules" for consensus-based decision
making and group facilitation. See id. at pt. I.
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as the underlying interests and needs of parties and often to serve as
spokesperson to media or public about issues to ensure confidentiality for
parties during deliberation (if appropriate); 76
4. Participation of as many stakeholders (interested parties) as possible;
not merely those limited by legal rules in litigation or other procedural
rules; including both direct participation (where possible) and representa-
tion of constituencies;
5. Rules and processes for deliberation about proposals, as well as ratifica-
tion; and
6. Monitoring and procedures for implementation.
Elements of these basic criteria may be modified depending on whether a
consensus building event is scheduled around an ad hoc event or issue (particu-
lar litigation resolution, community dispute or budget allocation) or whether an
on-going organization or agency seeks to establish different decision rules or
participation goals over the long run (a governmental structure, an NGO, a new
entity, such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or, heaven forbid, a
faculty department). Lawrence Susskind, for example, has offered a new flexi-
ble "codification" of consensus building "rules" that are easily modified for ad
hoc or more permanent groups.
The key to such processes is that they are professionally developed and
managed to evolve from the needs of the particular parties engaged and so are
flexible. Also, once elaborated, these events provide clear rules of process, as
well as decision. Consensus building is democratic because parties decide their
own rules but they are also facilitated or "guided" by those who have some
expertise about process7 7 (and sometimes the substance) - to wit, the role of
lawyers! Ideally, expert facilitators can minimize the strategic gaming and bar-
gaining78 that may occur when unequal parties come together to deliberate.79
Of course, use of experts, whether process experts, like professional facilitators,
or lawyers, as meeting managers or substantive or process experts, might seem
a bit ironic in this context. These processes are designed to be participatory and
democratic - why would they need experts or leaders? Some processes do
indeed proceed without leadership (see Modes of Conflict Resolution Chart
below) and can be considered more participatory or "grassroots," but where
76 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL
GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES (Free Press 1996).
77 Even the American Association of Law Schools has recognized the importance of process
expertise in training legal educators to facilitate law school strategic planning events, as
evidenced by the creation of the AALS Resource Corps.
78 See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); Leigh L. Thomp-
son, Groups and Teams: Multiple Parties at the Bargaining Table, in THE MIND AND HEART
OF THE NEGOTIATOR (2d ed. 2001); Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bar-
gaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 243 (1994); Cass D. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?
Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L. J. 71 (2000).
79 Many consensus-building processes involve pre-event negotiation and interest-based bar-
gaining training. For example, in the Kyoto Accords deliberations parties were given negoti-
ation training before meetings began. Much of interest-based bargaining in labor relations
now depends on parties being trained in interest-based negotiations before actual negotia-
tions begin. See RICHARD E. WALTON et al., STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS: A THEORY OF
CHANGE IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994).
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some "ordering" is necessary to structure democratic deliberation, use of pro-
cess experts, who make no substantive recommendations or decisions, should
be consistent with these more flexible processes. This is wholly consistent with
modern conflict resolution theory, as well as Lon Fuller's older and more basic
notions of "process pluralism" and "institutional competence" where different
kinds of third parties are used in different kinds of processes, with different
party concerns and structures.8 °
Successful consensus building exercises have accomplished such things as
negotiated agreements for monetary allocations, clean-up procedures for envi-
ronmental Superfund sites, 81 water management,82 site location of unpopular
public and private land-uses (airports,83 waste dumps, commercial enterprises,
parking garages, half-way houses), city charter drafting,84 strategic planning for
states, court systems, municipalities, universities, private corporations and pub-
lic governmental bodies, as well as NGO's and non-profit entities, negotiated
rule-making in environmental use,85 transportation,8 6 Indian affairs,87 taxation,
health and safety regulations, environmental clear air and water standards, med-
ical and ethical decision-making, 88 inter-group relations and community dis-
putes, statewide regulations, workplace relations,89 political and religious
reconciliation processes9" and most significantly, when it works, international
cross border and internal peace initiatives.9" Consensus-building-like processes
have even been used to facilitate both "public" and "private" conversations
about such hotly contested political and moral matters as abortion,9 2 affirma-
8 Fuller, supra note 6.
81 Scher, supra note 66.
81 Janet C. Neuman, Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and
Farmers Happy - For a Time, 67 U. CoLo. L. REV. 259 (1996).
83 Peter Driessen, Activating a Policy Network: The Case of Mainport Schiphol, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 685.
84 Kate Connolly, From City Hall to the Streets: A Community Plan Meets the Real World,
in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 969; John Parr, The Chattanooga
Process: A City's Vision is Realized, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7
at 951; Susan L. Podziba, The Chelsea Charter Consensus Process, in THE CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 743.
85 Freeman, supra note 34.
86 CHRISTINE CARLSON, TRANSPORTATION RULE-MAKING IN OREGON, POLICY CONSENSUS
INSTITUTE (2000).
87 Jan Jung-Min Sunoo & Juliette A. Falkner, Regulatory Negotiations: The Native Ameri-
can Experience, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7 at 901.
88 MANAGING IN ACADEMICS: A HEALTH CARE MODEL (Jill Ridky & George F. Sheldon
eds., 1993); Mark E. Meaney, A Deliberative Model of Corporate Medical Management, 28
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 125 (2000).
89 Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L. J. 1 (2000); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Struc-
tural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
90 See David Brubaker, Organizational Trauma Recovery: The "God's Fellowship Commu-
nity Church" Reconciliation Process, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note
7, at 1051.
91 See WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT
(Melanie C. Greenberg et al. eds., 2000); see also GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE
(2000).
92 See Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstarphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in
THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1031.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
tive action,93 and AIDS-HIV,94 where goals of the process may be different
from undertaking some action (such as reducing violence at abortion clinics)
and can include simply "reframing" of issues and making efforts at mutual
understanding.
As some examples, consider the use of consensus building processes at
two ends of a spectrum - the first, action-oriented with a goal of drafting a
regulation or agreeing to take some action. Those negotiated rule-making enter-
prises which have been successful95 have required hundreds of hours of infor-
mation gathering, meeting time, separate caucus sessions, meetings in plenaries
and meetings with constituencies, but the theory is that complex deliberative
processes with much time invested up-front leads to rules with greater inputs, if
more complex outputs, and therefore greater compliance.
At the other end of the spectrum, consider the efforts to manage delibera-
tive conversations about affirmative action and abortion. In those which I par-
ticipated and led during California's debate about Proposition 209 (voter
disapproval of the use of governmental affirmative action plans in education,
employment and government contracting), efforts were made to ask participat-
ing parties to state their views, the origins, data or experiences from which their
views were derived, their own ethnic, gendered and racial background, what
grey areas or questions they had about their own views, as well as others. Such
efforts to create "structured conversations" around highly divisive issues, away
from the two-sides debate mode96 elaborated more complex views than either
pro-or-con affirmative action (including group variations in use of affirmative
action in education, employment, contracting and for different indicia of
"affirmative" and group relief).
Thus, formats which provide greater opportunities for more subtle and
complex views to be expressed enable the complexities of social and legal
issues to be explored and "cross-interests" to be recognized. It was deeply
unfortunate that as a polarized election required the populace to vote up or
down on a highly complicated social and legal issue, our affirmative action fora
were demonstrating that large members of the public and interested parties (stu-
dents, government officials, and private contractors) could actually be educated
to see the complexities of the issue as they interacted more with people of
different views who might be affected both "positively" and "adversely" by
particular legal actions. The Proposition 209 election, the law it "enacted" and
the lawsuits which followed, cut, perhaps, with too blunt a knife, issues that
might have been dealt with more effectively in a longer and more variegated
issue discussion with more subtle and varied rules for different contexts.97
13 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 34-35.
14 See Michael A. Hughes et al., Facilitating Statewide HIV/AIDS Policies and Priorities in
Colorado, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1011.
91 Environmentalists, social scientists and administrative law scholars continue to debate the
available data on the success of these proceedings. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 72;
Freeman, supra note 34.
96 See DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE
(1998) (describing how agnostic debate has marred public discourse in the media, education,
and politics, as well as in the legal system).
97 To contrast legal and more consensus based forms of decision making see Symposium,
The Meanings of Merit: Affirmative Action and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23
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In one of the most interesting examples of the differences in group deliber-
ative processes, Jon Elster has been analyzing the process differences in Consti-
tution formation. From his studies of both American and French constitution
making,98 he suggests that there are significant differences between processes
based on principles and reasons (which can lead to rigid, non-bargainable dis-
putes and extreme outcomes) versus interest-based bargaining (where trades,
compromises and log-rolling is possible). There are also differences between
those processes that are public (and lead to immovable stances) and processes
that are secret (where compromises and changes in positions can be negoti-
ated). Thus, Elster argues that the success of the American constitutional
processes may be attributable, at least in part, to particular processes choices
(secrecy, and committee, rather than public plenary, sessions) which many
political theorists would label second best because of the covert interest bar-
gaining, rather than public and principled argument. Pragmatists, on the other
hand, would recognize the greater stability of such "bargained for" and interest-
based outcomes. The American constitutional deliberations, characterized by
committees, secrecy and interest-based trades (including compromises on slav-
ery, urban-rural representation and other matters) produced a constitution far
more robust9 9 (if perhaps more unjust) than the French constitutional process
with its plenary, and public, if more principled, processes. What this should
teach us is that democratic discourse processes can and should take different
forms, depending on the issues at stake and the understandings we now have
about how particular processes themselves affect substantive outcomes and
whether they are designed to be contingent and temporary or more constitutive.
Below, I have built upon Elster's observations about three different
"modes of discourse" - principled (based on reasoned argument), bargaining
and preference trading of interests and expression of emotions, religious or
other values ("passions") - and the different kinds of processes that might be
employed in making decisions or resolving conflicts - (public/private; plenary/
committee; constitutive/permanent/ad hoc; expert-facilitated/naturalistic-
leaderless) - to sketch out some examples of different kinds of decision making
and government processes in different settings. This chart graphically repre-
sents the kind of process diversity or pluralism that might be used in different
settings, depending on what kinds of groups are trying to make what kinds of
decisions (e.g., temporary, permanent; full constituencies, representatives).
Other categories of groups or kinds of decisions can easily be elaborated and I
invite readers to consider the multiplicity of kinds of issues, conflicts, problems
and disputes that individuals and the full polity must resolve if we are to live
successfully together. My point in elaborating these examples is to suggest that
in conflict resolution, problem solving, and democratic decision-making, one
size or shape of process does not (and should not) fit all. While our constitution
suggests the importance of separation of powers in three branches of govern-
HASTINGS L. Q. 921 (1996). Consensus-building processes and the outcomes they deliver
raise issues of rules versus standards (discretion) and generalized or universal principles
versus contextual specificity and adaptability.
9 See Elster, supra note 3.
9 With, of course, the interruption of a Civil War, and then a series of crucial amendments
which revised the document, if not all civic practices.
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ment and federalism suggests multiple sites and levels of decision-making,
many kinds of decisions that affect us today need greater flexibility than formal
processes may permit. The following chart or taxonomy of types of processes,
with examples, is intended for us to see the possible variability in human deci-
sion processes.
MODES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
100
Bargaining Passions (needs/
Mode of Discourse Principled (Reasons) (Interests) emotions/religion
Forms of Process
Closed Some court Negotiation-US Mediation (e.g.
proceedings; arb. Constitution; divorce)
diplomacy.
Open French Constitution; Public Negotiations; Dialogue Movement
courts; arb some labor
Plenary French Constitution Reg-Neg. Town meetings
Committees Faculty committees; US Constitution/US Caucuses-interest
Task groups Congress groups




Permanent Government, Business Religious Org; AA,
Institutions Organizations, Union WW
Constitutive UN, National Const. Nat. Const./Prof. Civil justice
Assoc. movements, peace
Temporary/Ad Hoc Issue org./social Interest groups Yippies, New Age,
justice vigilantes
Principles = reasons, appeals to universalism, law
Bargaining = interests, preferences, trading, compromises
Open = public or transparent meetings or proceedings
Closed = confidential, secret process or even outcomes (settlements)
Plenary full group participation, joint meetings
Committees = task groups, caucuses, parts of the whole
Expert = facilitator-led by expertise (process or substantive or both)
Naturalistic = leaderless, grassroots, ad hoc
Permanent (organizational, institutional),
Constitutive ("constitutional"),
Temporary/ad hoc groups or disputants
Some predicted effects of process on outcome:
Closed (confidential) proceedings allow more expression of interests, needs and passions = More
"honest" and candid"-allow more "trades", less posturing, open to vulnerability
Open (transparent) proceedings require more principled/reasons justifications/ produce more
rigidity
'0 Partially derived from categories specified by Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in
BARRIERS TO CONFICT RESOLUrION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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V. ROLE(S) OF LAWYERS IN CONSENSUS BUILDING AND
DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES
Many of the examples of actual consensus building processes cited above
were led and participated in by a great variety of citizens, parties, and interested
stakeholders, as well as by particular kinds of experts. In my view, however,
lawyers have many important roles to play in these efforts to engage the citi-
zenry in more deliberative events, which govern their lives. Obviously, lawyers
traditionally play roles as advocates and representatives of constituencies in
both formal and less formal proceedings at which governance decisions and
actions may be taken.' This is the all important conventional role, though I
think even here conventional adversary lawyers may need to adopt different
approaches to representation and advocacy in an environment where "posi-
tions," interests and needs may become more dynamic as the processes con-
tinue. Consensus building processes are designed to change all parties' views of
what they need and what is possible - they are not effective when parties main-
tain the same position and simply argue "from reason" or "law" that they are
"right." By definition, a consensus building process is convened when there is
a need to organize group acceptability or legitimacy about a particular action,
decision or policy outcome. The lawyer who can problem solve creatively" °2
may better serve a client in a consensus building environment than one who
argues or advocates well.
More importantly, I want to suggest here that lawyers may be particularly
well suited to the design, management and facilitation of consensus building
processes, especially those which implicate law, such as environmental, regula-
tory, governance, land-use and other "legal" problems. It might actually facili-
tate a process to have legal experts, as well as process and substantive experts,
who can respond to questions of legality, drafting and implementation issues.
And, lawyers who have studied procedure and have mastered logical and
deductive, as well as inductive, thinking can often keep unruly democracy in
some kind of structured order. 10 3 Lawyers are particularly good at issue-spot-
ting and ordering, seeing "both" (or, as I prefer, "all") sides of an issue and
organizing presentations of materials. They are also professionally trained to
investigate, seek and organize information, even if, unlike scientists, they do
not "produce" the information or knowledge. Some of these traditional lawyer-
ing skills are particularly salient in designing and implementing consensus
building or stakeholder negotiation meetings. They must be "married" to other
skills (listening, facilitating, reframing) to be most effectively employed in
these new settings.
1ol See Charles F. Sabel & William Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litiga-
tion Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (describing transformation of public interest
litigation from rights-based challenges to more "experimentalist" negotiated interventions in
governmental agency action, with more stakeholder participation and measured
accountability).
102 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2001).
103 See Dwight Golann & Eric E. Van Loon, Legal Issues in Consensus Building, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 495.
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At the same time, if lawyers are to be fruitfully employed in such com-
plex, multi-party events of democratic deliberation, they must be taught differ-
ent, additional things than they are taught now' °4 - including the economic,
sociological and psychological theories and empirical verities of group behav-
ior, the social and psychological dimensions of human interaction (and more
prosaically, meeting management, negotiation and the sorts of things that are
taught in business and public policy schools) and the intellectual breadth to
manage more than oppositional, binary thinking."°5 At its most difficult, law-
yers will have to perform in roles requiring "neutrality ' and so-called "objec-
tivity" taken from more mediational roles than those of the more familiar
advocate. This has implications for the ethical rules and practice norms which
govern us and assume that advocacy (or at least partisanship, even in the trans-
actional role) is our norm. 11 6
I do not want to suggest that only lawyers can perform these functions of
design, facilitation, or representation in these new forms of participatory deci-
sion making. Most of the first generation of consensus building professionals
were not lawyers (e.g. Lawrence Susskind, a city planner by training; Peter
Adler, a sociologist by training); many are community organizers, social work-
ers, psychologists, scientists and have training in skills and substantive knowl-
edge that are also well suited to these more flexible forms of decision making.
Nevertheless, I think legal training, if properly supplemented with new skills
training (as legal clinicians have spent the last three decades accomplishing), is
particularly appropriate for integrating substantive legal rights, technical legal
procedural requirements and greater flexibility in social and legal problem solv-
ing. Many law schools have already recognized this, in the growth of conflict
resolution and more broadly based legal problem solving curricula.'0 7
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
If more participatory models of democracy are to be generated, experi-
mented with and evaluated, there is much to recommend the use and adaptation
104 And of course, we have a new textbook to teach them, see CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2005).
105 If law "sharpens the mind by narrowing it." (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., A Man and the
Universe, Address Before the Brown University Commencement (1897), in THE MIND AND
FAn OF JUSTICE HOLMES 36 (Max Lerner ed. 1943), also in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 518 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (attributing the quote to Edmund
Burke)), then will we make lawyers less acute by asking them to hold many more "posi-
tions" or "arguments" in their heads at one time?
106 I have written extensively on the issue of how our lawyer's ethics rules will have to be
re-crafted to reflect such new roles if we are to be recognized as lawyers performing these
roles. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a
New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Profession-
alism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153 (1999); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as
Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997).
107 The Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution awards an annual prize
for innovation in Problem Solving Education in law schools. See Awards Program at http:l/
cpradr.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). See also, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolu-
tion: Raising the Bar and Enlarging the Canon, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 4 (2004).
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of the quasi-legal processes of consensus building processes currently in use at
all levels of government, policy formation and organizational management. The
advantage of some of these forms of consensus building is that they are flexi-
ble, but structured, drawing on their own ground-up developed procedural rules
and substantive rules of decision and grounds for substantive enactment. Many
of these processes look different from conventional legal processes - they all
involve more players, parties and stakeholders than litigation, legislation and
administrative regulation. They often result in contingent and complex "agree-
ments." Their relation, both at a process level and at the substantive level, to
formal governmental structures remain uncertain in many cases and "experi-
mentalist," as others have called them. Nevertheless, I think there is exciting
substantive legal work to be done to attempt to understand how more par-
ticipatory processes might substitute for or supplant some of our traditional
institutions that are rendered inoperable by polarized "grid-lock" or conven-
tional issue stand-offs. For my part, I am interested in exploring how those with
legal training can harness what they already know to learn how to facilitate and
"manage" these new processes, not only as "architects of process," but as
"architects of participatory democracy." I have seen it work and I am interested
in adding to the lawyer's repertoire the ability to create new processes and
institutions and to participate in them to provide more participatory and legiti-
mate outcomes and more humane processes. If lawyers are to join these efforts
in creating and participating in new forms of decision making and problem
solving, then we must consider how we are to expand our conceptions of
"thinking or acting" like a lawyer.
